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The author ends with a chapter that
highlights the issues contributing to
Central Asia’s woeful situation and
offers some thoughts about forging stability there. This latter portion is disappointingly short; Rashid devotes only
nine pages to discussing possible solutions to alleviating Central Asia’s plight.
A more developed discussion would
have been beneficial.

security policy focus “on oil field protection, the defense of maritime trade
routes, and other aspects of resource
security.” This position represents a
reaffirmation of the industrial and economic dimensions of U.S. national security. In effect, if Klare is right, we are
witnessing a resurgence of a materialist
strand of American strategic thought
that has been prominent at least since
Alfred Thayer Mahan. For strategists,
neither the clash of civilizations, the
tragedies of identity politics, nor the
long-buried animosities of religion or
ethnicity are sufficient motivations for
the major sources of conflict in the
modern world. Rather, conflicts and
national security policies are about the
struggle for natural resources.

Aside from this flaw, Jihad provides an
excellent overview of the reasons for the
rise of militant elements in Central Asia.
The book gives an understanding of the
stakes involved in Central Asia’s security
and how the region applies to U.S. interests. Central Asia has become significant
for U.S. interests not only because of the
prospects for oil but also for its potential
as a haven for terrorist bases.

Lest anyone think that this is a purely
American phenomenon, Klare suggests
that the “economization” of international security affairs holds not just for
the United States but also for most
countries, including China, Japan, and
Russia. Insatiable consumption coupled
with finite, poorly distributed resources,
as well as with a propensity to use armed
force, leads to a conflict-ridden future.

United States, China, and Russia as it
relates to oil pipelines and regional stability. He also goes into detail regarding
neighboring states, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, and
their respective agendas toward the region. These chapters round out a complete picture of all the factors affecting
Central Asia’s stability.

AMER LATIF

Joint Warfare Analysis Center
Dahlgren, Virginia

Klare, Michael T. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Henry Holt,
2002. 304pp. $15

Michael Klare argues that most wars of
the future, like many of those of the
past and present, will be caused by conflicts over natural resources, especially
oil and water. As a consequence, he
suggests that American national
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Much of Klare’s argument reads as if it
were inspired by the tumultuous events
of the 1970s, specifically after the first
global oil shock helped to alert the
world to upcoming neo-Malthusian dilemmas. The 1973–74 oil crisis, among
other events, forced the United States
and the world to face the reality that petroleum supplies are finite, poorly distributed across the globe, and vulnerable
to rogue states. Academics and policy
entrepreneurs then spent much of the
decade cataloguing the vast number of
critically important natural resources
that were in short supply or projected to
be, given consumption trends and
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demographic growth. Klare continues to
assume that resource shortages lie in
wait for humanity as a whole and for
specific societies in particular.
Unfortunately, Klare barely pauses to
consider the possibility that diplomatic,
economic, and political developments
might ease potential resource conflicts
before they escalate into armed conflicts. After all, countries fighting over
access to water or oil could simply negotiate arrangements or allow market
forces to dictate outcomes; the author
himself notes examples and cases where
diplomatic solutions have succeeded in
the past. In fact, the absence of economic reasoning in this book is startling. After all, economists from cranks
to countless mainstream professionals
have demonstrated how market forces
can help manage the worst aspects of
resource shortages. Thus energy shortages that lead to price increases in turn
encourage consumers to conserve; consumption is reduced, as well as overall
dependence. Hence, despite tremendous economic growth, Western Europe, Japan, and even the United States
have become much more energy efficient since the oil shock of the 1970s.
Substitution effects are also possible, although perhaps not for a resource as
fundamental and elemental as water.
This book is less than persuasive on the
topic of politics. In its final section,
which describes alternatives to war,
Klare sets up a straw man, arguing that
“it seems reasonable to ask whether a
resource-acquisition strategy based on
global cooperation rather than recurring conflict might not prove more effective than guaranteeing access to
critical supply over the long run.” He
then answers his own question by
claiming that “such a strategy would
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call for the equitable distribution of the
world’s existing resource stockpiles in
times of acute scarcity.” In short, Klare
suggests a utopian solution to a deeply
practical set of problems. It is more
likely that many, if not most, of the various potential resource “wars” outlined
here will be settled short of war (or at
least of a major war) by various methods
of muddling through. Grand bargains
over potentially equitable distributions
of various resources seem unlikely given
the present state of international politics.
Even if one accepts Klare’s dire assumptions about the possibility of shortages
and conflicts, his list is very traditional.
Oil and water conflicts are old news. He
does not mention the possibility of new
competitions, for resources like satellite
“parking spaces” or access to ocean
fisheries, that might lead to clashes
among great powers. Nor does he explore in great detail demographic realities that underlie competition for water
and energy. For many of the water conflicts, for example, the key variable is
tremendous population growth, which
makes old agreements obsolete and intensifies bargaining over future
resources.
Criticisms aside, Resource Wars offers
readers a great deal. Klare provides
thumbnail summaries of numerous
conflicts great and small, from the
South China Sea to the headwaters of
the Nile. He represents each case with
grace and economy. He reminds us of
the oft-forgotten histories and details of
geography that matter greatly in resource wars. More importantly, Klare
provides a useful corrective to the
ideational, historical, and political explanations of international behavior so
popular today. Even the Arab-Israeli
conflict is linked to competition for
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land and water in ways that some who
focus on the religious conflicts, the
shadow of the past, and the various
weaknesses of the Israeli-Palestinian
and other Arab authority structures forget. In short, academics, policy makers,
and military officers should pay close
attention to those regions that have the
greatest potential for armed conflict
based on the relative scarce supplies of
critical resources.
PETER DOMBROWSKI

Naval War College

Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. The Age of
Sacred Terror. New York: Random House, 2002.
490pp. $25.95

Were you to begin with the last chapter
of this book, “A World of Terror,” you
would note that radical Islamists do not
have an exclusive hold on terror as a
strategic weapon. In fact, you might be
well advised to consider reading this
chapter first, to understand that extremist adherents of Christianity as well
as other faiths also have employed sacred terror as a tool in the pursuit of
their aims. If, on the other hand, you
choose to begin with chapter 1, you will
receive a good overview of the terrorist
events of the past ten to twelve years,
with a focus on those of Islamic origin.
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon,
senior staff members of the Clinton
administration’s National Security
Council, paint a coherent picture of the
genesis of sacred terror, the response to
it, and prospects for the future. The
time frame also includes the end and
the beginning of the two Bush administrations. Benjamin and Simon’s conclusion points out the long-term nature of
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the issue and recommends that the
West engage it with a view to the
postconflict possibilities. The book’s
purpose may include an attempt to influence history’s interpretation of the
data, particularly with regard to the
years of the authors’ involvement, but
that hardly negates its significance.
Benjamin and Simon offer three particularly valuable discussions. First, they
carefully tease three threads from the
history of radical Islamism. Second,
they give an airing to the workings of
government—probably always less than
transparent. In this, they do not hesitate
to parcel out responsibility for good
and for ill. Finally, they offer a strategic
reflection that goes beyond radical
Islamism.
That Islam was, and can be, a religion
of the sword should come as no surprise. After Muhammad (d. 632), Taqi
al-Din ibn Taymiyya, born in 1269, an
accomplished Islamic jurist at age
twenty, established the intellectual underpinning of today’s radical Islamism.
Ibn Taymiyya did more than anyone to
erect jihad—actual warfare—as a pillar
of Islam. From him descended in the
subsequent centuries serious intellectuals, hard men ready to commit violence, messianic figures whose zeal
seems most foreign to twenty-firstcentury realities. Together, “they feed
into the eruption of jihadist Islamism
that has confronted the West, America
in particular, over the last decade.”
Now, the warrior prince Usama bin
Laden carries jihadism into the new
millennium.
“Exactly when the name Usama bin
Laden began appearing in American intelligence reports and FBI investigative
materials is something we are unlikely
to ever learn.” This observation,
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